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The AEDPA and the IIRIRA: Treating Misdemeanors
as Felonies for Immigration Purposes
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1996, Congress amended the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA) by
passing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) l and the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA).2 The AEDPA and the
IIRIRA greatly increased the list of crimes that constitute "aggravated felonies" for im-
migration purposes. Prior to 1996, an alien had to actually receive a sentence of five
years or more in order for his or her crime to be considered an aggravated felony.3 Now,
crimes with sentences as short as one year can be considered aggravated felonies and
aliens do not need to receive the full sentence to be in danger of removal. 4 As long as the
crime carries a possible sentence of one-year, an alien may be designated as an aggra-
vated felon. 5 Because many crimes carrying a possible sentence of one year are misde-
meanors or non-aggravated felonies, for all practical purposes, the AEDPA and the
IIRIRA force judges to recharacterize misdemeanors and non-aggravated felonies as
aggravated felonies solely for immigration purposes.
Although some judges do not agree with this recharacterization of misdemeanors as
felonies with short potential sentences, courts hesitantly continue to uphold the literal
language of the AEDPA and the IIRIRA. For example, in U.S. v. Pacheco,6 Circuit
Judge Miner stated, "in the case before us, we deal with the question of whether Con-
gress can make the word 'misdemeanor' mean 'felony.' As will be seen, we hold that it
can, because... we consider Congress 'to be the master - that's all.' ' 7 In making this
ruling, the circuit court affirmed the prior decision of the trial court. However, the trial
judge had hesitated to expand the definition of felonies in this manner. In the opinion,
the trial judge stated: "I don't - I can't imagine that the sentencing reformers really
meant [sic] this situation exists."8
According to Assistant Attorney General Robert Raben, even the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) recognizes that "the law has had disastrous consequences
for certain non-citizens." 9 In an effort to alleviate these admittedly disastrous conse-
1. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 8, 18 U.S.C.).
2. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
3. See Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the Limited
Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936, 1939 n.17 (2000).
4. See id at 1940.
5. See id.
6. 225 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2000).
7. Id. at 149.
8. Id. at 152.
9. INS Use of Prosecutorial Discretion: Reality or Myth?, ELLIS ISLANDER, (ABA Immigration Pro
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quences, the INS allows its prosecutors to use discretion when deciding "whether to
place an individual in immigration proceedings and to determine what charge to file
against him or her."1 ° However, this discretion may not significantly reduce the harsh-
ness of the IIRIRA and the AEDPA.
In this article, I will suggest some more effective methods to ameliorate this harsh-
ness. I will begin by examining the contrast between misdemeanors and felonies in Part
II. In Part II1, I will describe legal permanent residents (LPRs), a group which is detri-
mentally affected by the 1996 reform of immigration law. Part IV will contrast immigra-
tion law prior to 1996 with immigrationlaw after the enactment of 1996 statutes. Next,
in Part V, I will demonstrate the effect of these changes by providing statistics and ex-
amples of how the laws were applied to specific individuals. Part VI will discuss prose-
cutorial discretion and propose that depending solely on such discretion is not sufficient
to lessen the severity of the 1996 reform. Finally, in Part VII, I will establish that
legislative reform is the best way to bring equity back to the removal process and to
ameliorate the harshness of the AEDPA and the IIRIRA.
U. CONTRAST BETWEEN MISDEMEANORS AND FELONIES
The distinction between a misdemeanor and a felony is rooted deeply in our com-
mon law tradition. At common law, present day misdemeanors were known as trans-
gressions or trespasses and were defined simply as lesser crimes than felonies.11 Today,
a misdemeanor is defined as a "crime that is less serious than a felony and is usually
punishable by fine, penalty, forfeiture, or confinement (usually for a brief term) in a
place other than prison (such as a county jail)." 2 A person cannot be punished by death
or imprisonment for more than one year for a misdemeanor.'
3
As can be inferred from the definition of misdemeanor, felonies are more serious
crimes than misdemeanors. Initially, felonies, orfelonia, were defined as serious crimes
for which a vassal could forfeit his fee. 14 At common law, the punishment for felonies
evolved to include forfeiture of goods to the crown, in addition to the traditional forfei-
ture of land.15 Today, the definition of "felony" is "a serious crime, usually punishable
by imprisonment for more than one year or by death."' 6
For a felony to be labeled "aggravated," the seriousness of the crime must be in-
creased beyond that of the crimes on the borderline between a misdemeanor and a fel-
ony. For example, a felony could be considered aggravated if violence is involved, a
Bono Development and Bar Activation Project, Wash., D.C.), June 2000, at 6 [hereinafter ELLIS ISLANDER].
10. Id.
11. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 633 (7th ed. 1999).
12. Id. at 1014.
13. See 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 12 (1989).
14. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 633 (7thed. 1999).
15. See id.
16. Id.
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deadly weapon is used, or the perpetrator intends to commit another crime.17 In our
criminal code, only very serious felonies are deemed to be "aggravated felonies" and
misdemeanors are by definition not as serious as felonies. Therefore, misdemeanors
should not be recharacterized as aggravated felonies solely for immigration purposes
because doing so conflicts with our criminal code and common law tradition.
HI. THE EFFECT OF THIS RECHARACTERIZATION ON LEGAL PERMANENT
RESIDENTS
LPRs in the United States comprise one of the groups that is,the most affected by
the recharacterization of misdemeanors and felonies in immigration law. To acquire
LPR status, an alien must possess employment skills needed by the United States' labor
market, or a close family member who already has status in the United States must apply
for the alien. Therefore, LPRs either have skills that are assets to the United States, or
they already have family ties to the United States.
To maintain LPR status, aliens must reside in the United States continuously with
only "innocent, casual, and brief excursion[s] ... outside this country's borders."' 8 Such
excursions will not deprive aliens of their LPR status as long as their stay outside of the
United States is not for an extended period, and they do not have extensive property or
business ties in a foreign country.' 9
In exchange for sacrificing ties to their home countries, such as land, family, and
culture, and residing continuously in the United States, LPRs receive many of the same
rights and privileges that are extended to United States Citizens (USCs). For example,
LPRs have the right to enlist in the United States Army, Air Force, and Reserves of the
Armed Forces.20 LPRs also receive equal protection and due process rights from the
United States Constitution 21 with the exception of voting rights and presidential candi-
dacy.22 Therefore, the distinction between USCs and LPRs is minimal2 3
Although the status of an LPR is similar to that of a USC, public prejudice against
illegal aliens may have led to the inequity in the treatment of LPRs who commit minor
felonies and misdemeanors. Several events occurred prior to the enactment of the
AEDPA and the IIRIRA that fueled an "anti-immigrant" (especially "anti-illegal immi-
17. See id. at 64.
18. Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 462 (1963). See also 3A AM. JUR. 2D Aliens and Citizens § 458
(1998).
19. See 3A AM. JUR. 2D Aliens and Citizens § 458 (1998) (citing Chavez-Ramirez v. I.N.S., 792 F.2d
932 (9th Cir. 1986)).
20. See 3C AM. JUR. 2DAliens and Citizens § 2664 (1998) (citing 10 U.S.C.A § 3253 (West 1998)); 10
U.S.C.A § 8253 (West 1998); and 10 U.S.C.A. § 510 (b) (West 1998),(renumbered in §§ 12102 to 12104).
21. See Nora V. Demleitner, The Fallacy of Social "Citizenship," or the Threat of Exclusion, 12 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 35, 36 (1997).
22. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (stating that only United States citizens are eligible to be President).
See also U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (stating that only the voting rights of United States citizens cannot be
abridged).
23. See Demleitner, supra note 21, at 36.
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grant") sentiment amongst the general population. One of these events was the proposal
of California's Proposition 187.24 Proposition 187, which was supposed to take effect in
January of 1995, required California schools to verify the legal status of each child en-
rolled and prohibit children whose parents were not citizens, permanent residents, or
persons otherwise authorized under federal law to be present in the United States, from
attending public elementary and secondary schools. 25 Because this drew attention to the
number of illegal immigrants in the California school system, the issue of immigration
came to the forefront of the public's view during an election year. The North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which was passed in 1994, also focused the public's
attention on immigration and its ramifications on the United States economy. In addi-
tion, the February 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City focused
the public's attention on immigration issues because an immigrant was accused of plant-
ing the bomb. The effect this incident had on legislation is evidenced by both the title of
the Anti-Terrorist and Effective Death Penalty Act and its provision that bars "alien
terrorists from relief previously available to them at the [INS's] discretion. 26 As this
demonstrates, in Congress' effort to respond to the political pressure created by the
bombing of the World Trade Center, the proposal of Proposition 187, and the debate
over NAFTA, the legislature may not have considered all the ramifications the AEDPA
and the IIRIRA would have on legal immigrants, especially LPRs. Public prejudice and
rash legislative decisions caused by the events listed above should not be allowed to
govern how the United States applies its criminal and immigration laws to LPRs. If
crimes are classified as misdemeanors when they are committed by a USC, then they
should also be misdemeanors when they are committed by an LPR.
IV. CHANGES MADE BY THE IMMIGRATION REFORM OF 1996
A. Immigration Law Prior to 1996
Prior to 1996, deportation proceedings consisted of a two-step process for LPRs
who had been convicted of crimes.27 In the first step, the immigration judge (IJ) deter-
mined whether an alien could be deported. Aliens who committed aggravated felonies
became one of the groups that was no longer eligible for cancellation of removal when
Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (ADAA).28 When the ADAA
amended the INA in 1988, only "murder, drug trafficking, and illicit trafficking in fire-
24. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48215 (West Supp. 2001).
25. See id.
26. Jurado-Gutierrez v. Greene, 190 F.3d 1135, 1149 (10th Cir. 1999).
27. See Morawetz, supra note 3, at 1938.
28. See AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAWYER's Ass'N, INTRODUCING THE 1996 IMMIGRATION REFORM
ACT 57 (1996).
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arms" were considered to be aggravated felonies for immigration purposes. 29 However,
Congress continued to expand the definition of "aggravated felony." For example, the
Immigration Act of 1990, (IMMACT90), added money laundering, crimes of violence
for which an alien received a sentence of at least five years in prison, and any conspiracy
to commit these acts to the definition of "aggravated felony.,
30
After the IJ determined that an alien could be deported, the IJ moved to the second
step of the proceeding: determining whether the LPR should be deported. 31 The IJ's
discretion to decide whether an LPR should be deported arose from § 212(c) of the Im-
migration and Nationality Act (INA). Section 212(c) granted relief from deportation to
two groups of LPRs: 1) those who had not been convicted of aggravated felonies, and 2)
those who had been convicted of aggravated felonies, but who had already served at
least five years of the sentence received for the crime.32 The factors which Js consid-
ered when determining whether to waive deportation included: the circumstances of the
case, whether the LPR had been rehabilitated, the effect that deportation would have on
the LPR's family members, and the strength of the LPR's ties to his or her home coun-
try.33 If balancing these factors showed that the LPR should be allowed to remain in the
United States, the IJ could use discretion to grant an LPR relief from deportation.
Although the text of § 212(c) stated relief from deportation only applied to "aliens
lawfully admitted for permanent residence who temporarily proceeded abroad voluntar-
ily.., and [were] returning to a lawful unrelinquished domicile [in the United States] of
seven consecutive years, 3 4 Rosenberg v. Fleuti35 held that § 212(c) also applied in
criminal deportation hearings.36 As a result, prior to 1996, an LPR could obtain relief
from deportation even if convicted of an aggravated felony, as long as he or she had
served at least five years in prison to atone for the criminal activity and had other favor-
able extenuating circumstances.
B. 1996 Changes
Both the AEDPA and the IIRIRA greatly changed deportation/removal. Both §
440(e) of the AEDPA37 and § 321 of the Immigration Reform Act of 1996 (IRA)38
expanded the definition of "aggravated felony." As a result, when these acts became
effective in April of 1997, 39 crimes such as rape and sexual abuse of a minor were newly
29. Id.
30. See id.
31. See Morawetz, supra note 3, at 1938.
32. See AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAWYER'S ASS'N, supra note 28, at 52.
33. See Morawetz, supra note 3, at 1938-39.
34. See AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAWYER'S ASS'N, supra note 28, at 52.
35. 374 U.S. 449 (1963).
36. See AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAWYER'S ASS'N, supra note 28, at 52.
37. See AEDPA § 440(e) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(43) (1994).
38. See IRA § 321 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(43) (1994)).
39. See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 1997 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND
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classified as aggravated felonies for immigration purposes.40 In addition, the sentence
and monetary value thresholds necessary to qualify an alien for deportation were de-
creased for offenses already listed as aggravated felonies. 41 For example:
1. The threshold amount for money laundering was reduced from $100,000 to
$10,000;
2. Crimes of violence, theft offenses, racketeering or gambling offenses and brib-
ery, counterfeiting, forgery or trafficking in vehicles offenses used to require a
five-year term of imprisonment. They now only require a term of imprisonment
of one year;
3. The threshold amount for offenses in fraud and deceit was reduced from
$200,000 to $10,000; and
4. The threshold for tax evasion was reduced from an amount in excess of
$200,000 to an amount in excess of $10,000.42
Due to these changes, many crimes with potential sentences of as low as one year
are now "aggravated felonies" for immigration purposes. LPRs who commit misde-
meanors with one-year potential sentences are also deportable as aggravated felons even
if they have received a sentence of less than one year. For example, petty theft is a mis-
demeanor under New York law, but because it carries a potential one-year sentence, it
constitutes an aggravated felony for immigration purposes.43 As this demonstrates, to
deport an LPR, the literal wording of INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) and INA § 238(c) requires
a conviction for an "aggravated felony." However, being convicted in United States
criminal courts for felonies that are not "aggravated," and even for misdemeanors, still
can lead to the deportation of an LPR. The reason for this is that another body of law
characterizes LPRs as aggravated felons without the benefit of a hearing or considera-
tion of the circumstances.
In addition to expanding the definition of "aggravated felony," the IRA also ex-
panded the definition of "conviction."'44 "Conviction" is now defined as:
A formal judgment of guilt; or if adjudication of guilt has been withheld, where (i) a
judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has entered a plea of guilty or nolo
contendre or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt, and (ii) the
NATURALIZATION SERVICE 163 (1999).
40. See AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAWYER'S ASW'N, supra note 28, at 58.
41. See id.
42. Id. at 58-59.
43. Morawetz, supra note 3, at 1939, (citing United States v. Graham, 169 F.3d 787, 793 (3d Cir. 1999)).
44. See AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAWYER'S ASS'N, supra note 28, at 59.
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judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the alien's liberty
to be imposed.
45
Although the definition specifies that a sentence must be imposed in order to make
an alien eligible for deportation, courts have held that suspended sentences also qualify
an alien for deportation. 46 Therefore, an LPR is deportable if he or she receives a sen-
tence of one year, even if that sentence was suspended and the LPR was never impris-
oned. 47 Since the INA's definitions of "aggravated felony" and "conviction" were ex-
panded by the AEDPA and the IIRIRA, more LPRs are subject to removal today than
before the acts became effective in 1997.
The number of LPRs who can be removed has also increased because the AEDPA
applies its expanded definition of "aggravated felony" retroactively. When Congress
defined "aggravated felony" for immigration purposes in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1988, only convictions for murder, drug trafficking, and illicit trafficking in firearms
had a retroactive effect. 48 However, as a result of the expanded definitions included in
the immigration law reform of 1996, more crimes are retroactively considered to be
aggravated felonies. Section 321(b) of the IRA that applies to all the crimes the AEDPA
and the IIRIRA classifies as aggravated felonies states "notwithstanding any other pro-
vision of law (including any effective date) the term applies regardless of whether the
conviction was entered before, on, or after the date of enactment of this paragraph. 49
Therefore, even crimes committed before 1996, which qualified as misdemeanors at that
time, are now considered to be aggravated felonies for immigration purposes. As a result
of this retroactive application of the law, the number of deportable LPRs in the United
States has increased.
As the number of deportable LPRs increased, the number of aliens eligible for relief
from deportation decreased. Today, after the immigration court determines that an LPR
has committed an aggravated felony, AEDPA § 440(d) and IIRIRA § 304 "significantly
limit the cases where discretionary relief from removal can be sought.",50 A reason for
this limitation is that the second step of the deportation process, "the individualized
assessment of the appropriateness of deportation," was eliminated by the IRA.5 1 The
IRA eliminated the second step of the deportation process by repealing INA § 212(c),
which gave IJs discretion to waive deportation. Prior to the 1996 immigration law re-
forms, Us had the power to determine both whether an alien was removable and whether
such removal would be fair under the circumstances.52 Both of these determinations
45. INA § 101(a)(48)(A) (codified in 8 U.S.C. 1101 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)).
46. See Morawetz, supra note 3, 1939.
47. See id.
48. AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAWYER'S ASS'N, supra note 28, at 57.
49. Id. at 59.
50. St. Cyr v. INS, 229 F.3d 406, 409 (2d Cir. 2000).
51. See Morawetz, supra note 3, at 1939.
52. See id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 27-36.
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were made at deportation hearings and at exclusion hearings. Today, deportation and
exclusion hearings are both referred to as removal proceedings.53 Now, during a removal
proceeding, an IJ is only able to determine whether removal is warranted under AEDPA
§ 440 (d) and IIRIRA § 304. As a result, a conviction of an "aggravate felony" effec-
tively precludes an alien from asking for discretionary relief.
54
In addition to effectively eliminating the possibility for discretionary relief, the
IIRIRA increased the INS's authority to expedite removals of "aggravated felons" under
INA § 238, 8 U.S.C. 1228 (a)55 and eliminates the "innocent, casual, and brief excur-
sion" exception from Rosenberg v. Fleuti.5 6 IIRIRA § 308(b)(4) increases expedited
removals by giving the Attorney General authority under INA § 238 to. begin removal
proceedings and to attempt to complete all appeals thereof before the alien has been
released from custody.57 The court cannot intervene in these cases unless the LPR has a
credible fear of persecution upon return to his or her country of origin.5 8 Since this in-
creases the number of expedited removals, an IJ's ability to grant discretionary relief has
decreased. Also, since the IIRIRA makes persons who admit to or are convicted of cer-
tain crimes inadmissible, LPRs with what the IIRIRA designates as "aggravated felony
convictions" are no longer covered by Fleuti.59 Therefore, even if the LPR's excursion
outside of the United States is "innocent, brief, and casual," he or she will be barred
from reentering. Further, because the definition of both "conviction" and "aggravated
felony" has expanded for immigration purposes, fewer LPRs are eligible for relief from
removal and more LPRs deported from the United States.
V. EFFECT OF THE 1996 IMMIGRATION REFORM
A. Statistics
As a result of the changes the 1996 Immigration Reform made to immigration law,
many more aliens are deported for criminal activities than in the years before 1996. For
example, in fiscal year 1996, 37,243 aliens were deported for criminal or narcotics vio-
lations, 60 and an additional 156 aliens were deported for behavior related to criminal or
narcotics violations.6 1 Therefore, over one half of the total 69,317 deportations in 199662
53. See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 1997 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICE, 163 (1999).
54. See St. Cyr v. INS, 229 F.3d 406, 408 (2d Cir. 2000).
55. See INA § 238(a) (codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1228 (1994)).
56. 374 U.S. 449 (1963).
57. See INA § 238(a)(3)(A) (codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1228 (1994)).
58. See INA § 235(b)(1)(B)(iii)(1) (codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)).
59. United States v. Youboty, 2000 WL 962832, at *5-*6 (E.D.Pa. 2000).
60. See Department of Justice, supra note 53, at 183.
61. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 1996 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICE, 188 (1997).
62. See Department of Justice, supra note 53, at 183.
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were for behavior in some way related to criminal or narcotics violations. However,
after the IIRIRA and the AEDPA took effect in 1997 the number of people deported for
criminal activity greatly increased. In fiscal year 1997, 51,141 aliens were removed from
the United States for behavior related to criminal or narcotics violations,63 which is an
increase of 13,898 from 1996.
The effect of the IIRIRA and the AEDPA can also be seen in the number of aliens
who were under docket control and required to depart. In 1995, only 429 aliens were
under docket control and required to depart 64 because the INS possessed evidence that
the alien had a criminal conviction in his or her past.65 In 1996, the number remained
relatively low, with only 436 under docket control. However, in 1997, the aliens under
docket control and required to depart increased to 664.66
The number of criminal removals from the United States continues to be high com-
pared to the pre-1996 figures. In 1999, 14,239 aliens were removed from the United
States in the month of September alone.67 Of these, 5,594 were considered to be criminal
removals.68 Although the number of criminal removals dropped to 5,348 out of a total of
13,402 removals in October of 1999,69 the number of criminal removals remained high.
More recently, in September of 2000, there were 5,003 criminal removals out of a total
of 13,293 removals; 70 and, in October of 2000, the number of criminal removals in-
creased slightly to 5,075 out of 12,468 total removals. 7'
B. Effect on Individuals
In United States v. Pacheco,72 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed the conviction of Pacheco for one count of aggravated reentry follow-
ing deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(1). 73 Pacheco pled guilty at the Dis-
trict Court level and was sentenced to a 46-month prison term followed by three years of
supervised release. 74 In addition, he was ordered to pay a special assessment of one hun-
63. Id.
64. See id. at 188.
65. See id. at 193.
66. See id. at 191.
67. See http//www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphicsaboutins/statisticsmsrsepOOIREMOVAL.HTM.
(last visited Mar. 27, 2001).
68. See id.
69. See http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphicsaboutines/statisticsmsroctOO/REMOVAL.HTM.
(last visited Mar. 27, 2001).
70. See. http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/aboutines/statistics/msroctoo/REMOVAL.HTM.
(last visited Mar. 27, 2001).
71. See. http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/aboutines/statistics/msroct00/REMOVAL.HTM.
(last visited Mar. 27, 2001).
72. 225 F.3d. 148 (2dCir. 2000).
73. See id. at 149.
74. See id.
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dred dollars. 75 Pacheco received this harsh sentence because he had been convicted for
committing several misdemeanors in the years between 1990 and 1997.76 Three of these
misdemeanors included: a 1992 conviction of larceny under $500 for the theft of a $10
video game, a 1992 shoplifting conviction for the theft of four packs of cigarettes and
two packs of Tylenol Cold Medicine, and a 1995 conviction for simple domestic as-
sault.77 On each of these three occasions, Pacheco received a suspended one-year sen-
tence along with a one-year probation.78 In November of 1997, the INS informed
Pacheco that he was eligible for deportation based on the one-year suspended sentences
he had received for two of the three misdemeanor convictions.7 9 Although these sen-
tences were imposed for misdemeanors, Pacheco was treated as though he had commit-
ted aggravated felonies for immigration purposes because he had received one-year
sentences. 80
The district court made this decision because the judge felt obligated to follow the
precedent set by the Third Circuit in United States v. Graham.81 In Graham, the court
held that: "Congress' definition of the term 'aggravated felony' for the purposes of the
INA was a 'term of art' that 'includes certain misdemeanants who receive a sentence of
one year.''82 In order to follow this precedent, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of New York found that Pacheco's crime constituted an aggravated
felony even though he had only been convicted of misdemeanors.83 The district court's
reluctance to make this holding is evident from the statements of Judge Norman A.
Mordue at Pacheco's sentencing hearing. At the hearing, Judge Mordue stated: "I just
want the record to reflect I think it's an incredibly harsh sentence .... And I don't - I
can't imagine that the sentencing reformers really meant this situation [to exist], but
that's not according to the Third Circuit., 8
4
Another case that demonstrates the effect of the 1996 immigration reforms is Ju-
rado-Gutierrez v. Greene.85 In Jurado-Gutierrez, the Tenth Circuit consolidated several
cases that questioned AEDPA § 440(d)'s retroactive application, its elimination of INA
§ 212(c)'s discretionary waiver of deportation, and its equal protection implications
since it applies to deportable, but not to excludable, aliens. One of the cases in Jurado-
Gutierrez concerned Benigno Palaganas-Suarez, a twenty-eight year old citizen of the
Philippines who had been an LPR in the United States since he was fourteen years old.86
75. See id.
76. See id. at 149-50.
77. See id. at 150.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See generally United States v. Pacheco, 225 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2000).
81. See Pacheco, 225 F.3d at 152 (citing United States v. Graham, 169 F.3d 787 (3d Cir. 1999)).
82. Pacheco, 225 F.3d at 152 (citing Graham, 169 F.3d at 792).
83. See Pacheco, 225 F.3d at 152.
84. Id. (quoting Mordue, J.).
85. 190 F.3d 1135 (10th Cir. 1999).
86. See id. at 1141.
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At the time of the trial, he was married to a USC and had four children.8 7 In 1988, Mr.
Palaganas-Suarez pled guilty to assault in the second degree and, in August of 1996, he
pled guilty to theft.88 Because these are both crimes of moral turpitude, the INS began
deportation proceedings for Palaganas-Suarez in October of 1996.89 The deportation
proceedings lasted until after the effective date of the IIRIRA in November of 1997.90 At
that time, even though Palaganas-Suarez's crimes had occurred before the effective date,
the INS amended its charge against Palganas-Suarez to make him deportable under INA
§ 241(a)(2)(iii) because the statute now considered Palganas-Suarez's crimes to be ag-
gravated felonies. 9' On January 8, 1997, an IJ found that Palganas-Suarez could not
apply for a 212(c) waiver under the statute as it was worded after the AEDPA and the
IIRIRA were enacted.92
Palganas-Suarez appealed this decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA).93 The BIA affirmed the W's decision, and Palaganas-Suarez appealed to a federal
district court on the grounds that AEDPA, which applies to deportable but not to ex-
cludable aliens, violates equal protection.94 The district court held that construing §
440(d) to treat aliens in exclusion and deportation proceedings differently does violate
equal protection.95 However, the court did not grant Palganas-Suarez relief because it
found that both deportable and excludable aliens should be precluded from discretionary
relief.96 Therefore, Palganas-Suarez's rights had not been violated. 97 Palganas-Suarez
next appealed the equal protection question to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit. The Tenth Circuit consolidated Palganas-Suarez's case with the cases of
three other LPRs who had final orders of deportation entered against them because of
past criminal convictions.98 In all four cases, the court held that equal protection is not
violated by application of AEDPA § 440(d).
To determine the outcome of the other three cases, the Tenth Circuit also analyzed
whether AEDPA § 440(d) applied retroactively by using the Lindh-Landgraf test. 99 The
first step of the test is to determine Congress' intent. 10 However, the Tenth Circuit was
unable to determine whether Congress intended to apply § 440(d) retroactively or pro-
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See Jurado-Gutierrez v. Greene, 190 F.3d 1135, 1141 (10th Cir. 1999).
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See id. at 1148.
95. Id.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See id. at 1139.
99. See id. at 1149-50.
100. See id. at 1148.
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spectively because it found that the AEDPA was ambiguous.' °1 The final step of the
Lindh-Landgraf test asked the court to determine whether the statute had a retroactive.
effect.' 0 2 The Tenth Circuit found that AEDPA § 440(d) did not have a retroactive effect
because LPRs were on notice that they could be eligible for deportation and criminal
penalties when they committed the crimes. 10 3 Because an LPR could have no "settled
expectation" of discretionary relief, his or her situation was really not changed by the
removal of discretionary waiver of removal in INA § 212(c). 10 4 Therefore, the court
determined that AEDPA § 440(d) had only prospective effect.10 5 Because the court
found that the Congress' intent was ambiguous and that the AEDPA did not have a ret-
roactive effect, according to the Lindh-Landgraf test, AEDPA § 440(d) does not apply
retroactively. 10 6 Because the Tenth Circuit found that AEDPA § 440(d) does not apply
retroactively and that it does not violate equal protection, Palganas-Suarez, a twenty-
eight year old LPR who has four children, is married to a United States Citizen, and has
lived in the United States since he was fourteen, and three other LPRs were found to be
deportable.
VI. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION: A REMEDY FOR THIS HARSHNESS?
Despite these harsh consequences, the AEDPA and the IIRIRA continue to be sup-
ported by members of Congress who argue that prosecutorial discretion reduces the
severity of the immigration reforms of 1996.107 They argue this because prosecutorial
discretion allows prosecutors to determine whether to file charges against an alien and
whether to commence immigration proceedings against an alien. Factors that can be
considered when deciding whether to exercise prosecutorial discretion include: length of
residence in the United States, humanitarian concerns, honorable service in the United
States military, immigration history, and criminal history. 0 8 Although prosecutorial
discretion may reduce the harshness of the 1996 immigration legislation slightly, relying
on only prosecutorial discretion is not effective because "prosecutorial discretion by INS
leaves a person in limbo, at risk of future immigration enforcement action and unable to
travel outside the United States without the fear of being denied readmission. ' 09 As a
result, "[p]rosecutorial discretion is not a full or adequate substitute for the forms of
relief previously available from an [IJ] prior to the changes in the law in 1996."'110
101. See Jurado-Gutierrez v. Greene, 190 F.3d 1135, 1150 (10th Cir. 1999).
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id. at 1151.
105. See id.
106. See id. at 1150.
107. See ELLIS ISLANDER, supra note 9, at 6.
108. See INS PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION GUIDELINES (November 28, 2000), available at INS Fact
Sheet, http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/publicaffairs/factsheetsProsecut.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2001).
109. Id.
110. Id.
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Relying solely on prosecutorial discretion is also insufficient because some INS of-
fices encourage criminal attorneys to seek sentences that will result in deportation of
aliens. For example, a memo written by the INS office in Atlanta encouraged "prosecu-
tors to seek plea bargains and sentences that will result in deportation, and to not agree
to sentences or pleas which may allow immigrants to avoid deportation.""' The memo
states: "'[y]ou may encounter alien defendants that return to court to have their sen-
tences amended to avoid removal/deportation i.e. reduced from twelve months to eleven
months. Try to avoid this, by reducing the sentence, the alien may avoid removal."' 112
Because the INS is taking steps such as these to encourage deportation, the Agency is
hardly leaving decisions concerning prosecution to an attorney's discretion. Therefore,
providing prosecutorial discretion will not, by itself, ameliorate the harshness of the
AEDPA and the IIRIRA.
VII. LEGISLATIVE REFORM: NECESSARY TO AMELIORATE THE HARSHNESS OF
THE 1996 REFORMS
To truly ameliorate the harshness of the AEDPA and the IIRIRA, Congress must
amend § 440(d) of the AEDPA, which bars deportation waivers for aliens convicted of
aggravated felonies." 13 It must also amend § 348 of the IIRIRA, which provides that the
Attorney General may not grant a waiver to any LPR who has been convicted of an
aggravated felony since his or her admission for permanent residence. 114 Both of these
provisions amended § 212 of the INA in 19961 15 and effectively eliminated the second
step of the removal process - the individualized assessment of whether an LPR should
be removed. In order to make the removal process more equitable, this second step of
the process must be reestablished by reenacting § 212(c). Reenacting § 212(c) would
give Us the discretion to grant relief from deportation after making individual assess-
ments. Individual assessments would be made by considering the totality of the circum-
stances including factors such as: whether the LPR has been rehabilitated, whether the
LPR's family would suffer extreme and unusual hardship if the LPR was removed from
the United States, the number of years the LPR has resided in the United States, etc.
Factors such as these should be considered in order to bring fairness to the United
States' system of removal. As the AEDPA and the IIRIRA are currently interpreted, an
LPR who committed a felony years ago, served his or her sentence, and has been com-
pletely rehabilitated can be removed from the United States. Also, as a result of the 1996
reform, this removal cannot be waived even if it would bring severe hardship on the
111. ELLIs ISLANDER, supra note 9, at 6.
112. Id.
113. See Akorede v. Perryman, 1999 WL 262129, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 21, 1999) (citing AEDPA §
440(d), 110 Stat. 1277 (1996) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)).
114. See Akorede, 1999 WL 262129, at *l(citing IIRIRA § 348, 110 Stat. 3009-639 (1996) (codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1182 (1994 & Supp. V 1999))).
115. See Akorede, 1999 WL 262129, at *1 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)).
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LPR's family. In some instances, such as those demonstrated by United States v.
Pacheco, 116 IJs are forced by precedent to reach these decisions despite the fact that they
would prefer to make the opposite holding. Hence, Congress must reenact INA § 212(c)
to give Js the discretion to consider the totality of the circumstances.
Another way to restore equity to this legislation would be to use the same distinc-
tion between felonies and misdemeanors as is used in criminal law. If immigration law
used the same distinction between felonies and misdemeanors as that in the criminal
code, misdemeanors and felonies that are not aggravated would not be treated as aggra-
vated felonies. A way to accomplish this would be to use the federal guidelines' defini-
tions of misdemeanors, felonies, and aggravated felonies rather than maintaining sepa-
rate definitions for immigration law. Other reforms which would bring immigration
law's interpretation more in line with that of criminal law include: 1) returning the sen-
tencing requirement to five years or more, as was required before 1996 when the
AEDPA reduced the sentencing requirement to only one year or more, and 2) establish-
ing that the length of the sentence for removal purposes is the length of the sentence
actually received, not the length of the sentence which could possibly be received for the
crime. If changes such as these were made, there would no longer be an inconsistency
between the definition of an aggravated felony as it applies to citizens of the United
States (who are not sanctioned for committing an aggravated felony if they have com-
mitted a misdemeanor) and as it applies to LPRs (who are treated as though they have
committed a felony when they have only committed a misdemeanor). Therefore, amend-
ing the INA to define "aggravated felony" as it is defined in criminal law and allowing
for discretionary waivers of removal would decrease the discrimination based on na-
tional origin that the immigration reforms of 1996 brought to immigration law.
1 17
VIII. CONCLUSION
Congress made many changes to immigration law when it passed the Anti-
Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and the Illegal Immigration Re-
form and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). Some of these changes include: alter-
ing the definition of "aggravated felony," expanding the definition of "conviction," and
eliminating Us' discretion to provide relief from deportation. As a result of these
changes, the amount of removals have increased and judges, such as those who decided
United States v. Pacheco,18 feel that they are forced into making unfair decisions in
order to follow precedent and uphold the strict interpretation of the legislation. To stop
situations such as this from arising in the future, the 1996 immigration legislation must
be amended so Js have discretion to consider the totality of the circumstances and de-
termine whether an LPR should be removed. Also, the definition of "conviction" and the
116. 225 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2000).
117. See supra part IV(B); supra notes 43-69 and accompanying text.
118. 225 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2000).
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definition of "aggravated felony" must be retracted. For example, an "aggravated fel-
ony" should no longer include crimes that the United States criminal code defines as
misdemeanors or as non-aggravated felonies. Making these changes would bring equity
back to immigration law by reducing the discriminatory effect that the AEDPA and the
IRIRA have on LPRs. Therefore, LPRs would not suffer as much discrimination based
on their national origin, and the prejudicial sentiment that was prevalent in society prior
to the enactment of the AEDPA and the IIRIRA would no longer have as much control
over the treatment of LPRs facing removal.
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